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CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT DIALOGUE (1.1)

WANG CHONG, TRUTH, AND QUASI-PLURALISM
LAJOS L. BRONS

The first century Chinese philosopher Wang Chong 王充 has largely escaped the
attention of comparative philosophers. That this oversight is undeserved is shown by
two journal articles and an encyclopedia entry by Alexus McLeod (2007; 2011;
2012). McLeod sketches an intriguing picture of a philosopher whose style and
approach to philosophy reminds more of analytic philosophy than of popular images
of Chinese philosophy. Wang Chong preferred clear and direct argument to the
“flowery and artificial writing” (華偽之文) that he perceived to be customary in his
day,1 adhered to a kind of metaphysical realism, and advocated a two-faced
philosophical method of questioning (wen 問) what is unclear and challenging (nan
難) what is false or invalid.2
While McLeod deserves praise for making Wang Chong more accessible to a
Western audience, I have my doubts about his analysis of Wang Chong’s theory of
truth as presented in this journal (see McLeod 2011). McLeod argues that Wang
Chong implicitly adhered to a kind of pluralism about truth somewhat similar to the
theories defended by Crispin Wright and Michael Lynch in the last two decades, and
even improves on those by solving the problem of mixed discourse. In this response
to McLeod, I want to challenge (aspects of) this interpretation of Wang Chong, and
suggest a kind of “quasi-pluralism” that builds on both McLeod’s pluralist
interpretation and my critique thereof.
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1

Some of Wang Chong’s criticism of his contemporaries sound much like an analytic philosopher
commenting on continental philosophy.
2
On Wang Chong’s philosophical method, see McLeod (2007).
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1. CONCEPTS AND THEORIES OF TRUTH
In the introduction of his paper, McLeod (2011) remarks that the debate about
concepts of truth in early Chinese philosophy is weighed down by (implicitly)
assuming a correspondentist notion of truth. (And apparently this has led some to
suggest that, lacking a correspondentist theory of truth, the ancient Chinese were
lacking the concept of truth altogether.) I’m insufficiently familiar with that debate to
judge whether he is right, but I certainly agree with him that the debate should not be
weighed down by assuming one or another specific theory of truth (or even multiple
theories).
There is a difference between the concept of truth and a theory of truth. One can
have a concept of truth without having a theory of truth, but (obviously) not the other
way around. One can even have the concept of truth without having a (or one single)
word for it. Having the concept of truth is having the concepts of objectivity,
falsehood, error, and mistake; it is understanding that there is a difference between
what is the case and what is not. In a number of papers from the 1980s and 1990s,
Donald Davidson argued that propositional thought is impossible without the concept
of truth.3 If Davidson is right, then it would be impossible for the early Chinese to not
have the concept of truth. That having the concept of truth does not imply having a
theory of truth is illustrated by Davidson himself. Davidson defended a version of
primitivism: “truth is as clear and basic a concept as we have” (2001, 155) and the
search for a theoretical definition of the notion is mistaken, or a “folly” (2005a, 201).4 (Although this implies that primitivism is not a theory of truth — rather, it claims
that there cannot be a theory of truth — I will use the term ‘theory of truth’ loosely in
the following to include primitivist theories about truth.)
The view that the search for a theoretical definition of truth is mistaken is shared
by deflationism, which is sometimes overlooked in overviews of the debate about
truth framed in terms of the correspondentism - coherentism - pragmatism triad, but
that triad is about a century out of date. The two main parties in the contemporary
debate are correspondentism (including a number of variants and offshoots) and
deflationism.5 The old, idealist coherentism disappeared from the scene a long time
ago. A few new forms of coherentism have been proposed in the last quarter of the
3

Most of these papers can be found in Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective (Davidson 2001); see
especially chapters 7, 9, and 14.
4
This does not imply that ‘true’ doesn’t have a lexical definition capturing how we normally use the
term and reflecting our pre-theoretical understanding of truth. Davidson used different terms on
different occasions to characterize this pre-theoretical understanding, often relying on phrases like
“capturing the way things are / the world is”. On Davidson’s primitivism, see his (2001), chapter 10
and “Afterthoughts”, and (2005a), chapters 1 and 2.
5
The aforementioned primitivism about truth is a very marginal position in the philosophical debate
about truth, but it is conceivable that there are more primitivists outside that debate. This would make
perfect sense, as for a primitivist, there really is no incentive to debate truth. Truth, being a primitive,
is not something that can be the topic of a genuine debate. For a historical overview and defense of
primitivism, see Asay (2013).
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20th century, but most of those are coherence theories of knowledge or justification
and the few that are about truth never played an important role in the debate (and
moreover, most are not idealist), and contemporary variants of idealism such as antirealism (the idealism that doesn’t dare to call itself such) do generally not come with
a coherence theory of truth, but with a form of verificationism. Pragmatism, on the
other hand, still exists, but contemporary pragmatists mostly side with deflationism.
In other words, the field has been thoroughly shaken up. Moreover, many new
theories and offshoots of correspondentism (such as truthmaker theory and the
identity theory) have appeared, making it near impossible to sketch the current state
of the field in just a view short paragraphs. (But I will try nevertheless, focusing on
what matters for the main parts of this paper.)
1.1. TRUTH PROPERTIES AND ONTOLOGICAL COMMITMENTS
The main (but not only) point of contention between theories of truth is the nature and
status of the truth property (/-ies) and associated truth predicate(s). (A predicate is a
truth predicate if it is a linguistic representation or symbol of/for a truth property.)
The most common answer to the question ‘What kind of property is truth?’ is that it is
a substantive property. Truth — according to inflationism/substantivism — is
theoretical-definable; that is, there is or can be a theoretical definition of ‘true’. In this
respect, ‘true’ is like ‘fungus’, for example: its theoretical definition captures what the
members of a certain subclass within its domain have in common. Fungi have specific
genetic, biochemical, and so forth properties, and for an organism, to have these
properties means to be a fungus. Similarly, true sentences or propositions have
something in common that determines that they are true. For correspondentism and
related theories, that something is a truthmaker: what all true sentences or
propositions (truthbearers) have in common is that they are made true by (their)
truthmakers. What defines correspondentism is the truthmaking relation and the
ontological commitment to (a specific kind of) individual truthmakers.6
Deflationists, on the other hand, deny that truth is a substantive property. True
sentences or propositions have nothing in common (in addition to the truth property
and an infinite array of disjunctive properties with truth as one of the disjuncts). All
that can be said about truth, is what is said in Tarski’s famous T-schema:
(Ts) «p» is true ↔ p ,
in which «...» stands for a name-forming device such as quotation marks in case of
sentences or a phrase like ‘the proposition that ...’ in case of propositions. For
6

There are few philosophical concepts as obscure as that of ‘truthmaking’, but oddly, while among
analytic philosophers it is bon ton to accuse non-Western and/or continental philosophy of conceptual
obscurity, most of us seem to be blind for this log in our own eye. That said, Schnieder (2006) does an
excellent job at making the concept less obscure, although I cannot shake off the suspicion that he does
not so much clarify the concept of truthmaking (if there is one), but stipulates a particular version; a
version, moreover, that is too thin to do all the work it is generally supposed to do.
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deflationists truth is a merely logical or syntactic property, or not a “real” property at
all, but it has been pointed out by many that this would imply that truth cannot play
any explanatory role either.7 For example, it would be impossible to explain meaning
in terms of truth (or to base meaning on truth), which implies that deflationism
precludes truth-conditional semantics. It is partly for this reason that Davidson opted
for a third answer to the question what kind of property truth is: truth is a primitive
(i.e. it is explanatorily basic). Like deflationists (and almost all other theorists of
truth), Davidson accepts (Ts), but while for the deflationist (Ts) reveals something
about truth, for Davidson (Ts) reveals something about meaning (of «p»). Effectively,
primitivism does not allow truth to be defined like deflationism, but does allow it an
explanatory role (as in explaining meaning) like inflationism. There are no properties
true sentences or propositions have that make them true, but there may be properties
that true sentences or propositions have because they are true. Table 1 summarizes
the key differences between the above three answers.
Table 1: three kinds of truth property
Truth is a ...

Can truth be Can truth have an
-ism
defined?8
explanatory role?

substantive property

Yes.

Yes.

inflationism/substantivism

primitive/basic prop.

No.

Yes.

primitivism

logical/syntactic prop.

No.

No.

deflationism

A fourth answer to the question about the nature of the truth property (/-ies) is that
truth is a functional property, which means that a truth predicate is identified (as
such) by the functions or roles or functional roles it plays. Contrary to the previous
three answers, which are mutually exclusive, functionalism can be combined with
variants of the other answers.
There are two further questions about the truth property (/-ies) to which different
theories give different answers. Firstly: What kind of things (“truthbearers”) is truth a
property of? (Or what kind of things is the predicate ‘true’ attached to?) Most
common answers to this question are sentences, propositions, or beliefs. Avoiding a
choice between those, I will use the term ‘statement’ in the rest of this paper as a
neutral term. And secondly: How many truth properties are there? Usually this last
question is understood as asking for the number of substantive properties. The
answers then would be “zero” for deflationism and primitivism, “one” for
correspondentism and most other inflationist theories, and “more than one” for
7

See, for example, Field (1986); Davidson (2005b); Horwich (1998).
“Defined” refers here to theoretical definition (similar to ‘fungus’ above); it does not mean lexical
definition (capturing actual word use reflecting pre-theoretical understanding).
8
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pluralism. By implication, pluralism is inflationist. It is possible, however, that
counting substantive and non-substantive properties separately results in more finegrained distinctions and/or suggest possibilities that have not been (thoroughly)
explored yet. One such possibility, “quasi-pluralism”, is suggested in section 3 of this
paper.
Tarski’s T-schema is not just accepted by deflationists and primitivists, but by
almost all theorists of truth. Theories differ, however, in their interpretations of (Ts)
(as illustrated by the difference between deflationism and Davidsonian primitivism).
(Ts) means that «snow is white» is true if and only if snow is white. Hence, it seems to
relate the truth of the statement to reality or some part or property thereof: true
sentences somehow “correspond” to the world, but this is a loose sense of
correspondence that is accepted even by primitivism. What defines correspondentism
is a much stronger correspondence relation in which truthbearers are made true
individually by discrete and individual truthmakers, most often facts. The nature of
this claim and its implications can be made more precise by considering (Tf):
(Tf) «p» is true ↔ there exists some fact (that) p
(Ts) is often read as (Tf), or it is supposed that (Tf) follows from (Ts). It should be
noted that (Tf) is as ambiguous as (Ts), and — depending on interpretation — is
acceptable to most theorists of truth as well. This is because (Tf) does not specify the
nature of the biconditional. A deflationist could read it as a merely conceptual
relation: ‘true’ means the same as ‘it is a fact that’. Alternatively, it could be read as
implying an ontological dependency. For the correspondentist, true statements are
ontologically dependent on facts (or other kind of truthmakers); a primitivist could
opt for the converse (or side with the deflationist). That is, for the correspondentist,
facts make statements true, while for such a primitivist true statements “create”
corresponding facts as fact (i.e. they assign ‘fact’ status to some parts or aspects of
reality). In other words, if ontological dependence is assumed, then either facts are
truthmakers, or truths are factmakers. Correspondentism opts for the former, and is,
therefore, committed to the existence of individual, discrete, ontologically
independent9 facts (or other kind of truthmakers).
Theories accepting a looser sense of correspondence, on the other hand, imply no
such ontological commitment. The distinction matters as it implies that
correspondentism can only be attributed to a philosopher if she is ontologically
committed to such truthmakers (and of course, to the truthmaking relation). There is
no evidence in Lun-Heng 論衡, Wang Chong’s major work, of such ontological
commitment, but the metaphysical realism implicit in much of his critical writings
implies correspondence in the loose sense. Wang Chong was, therefore, most likely
not a correspondentist,10 but that does not imply that he implicitly adhered to one of
9

Or independent from true statements at least; they may be dependent on some other more
fundamental kind of entity, as long as this doesn’t lead to (vicious) circularity.
10
Of course, absence of evidence does not imply evidence of absence. See also section 2.3.
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correspondentism’s current contenders. The contemporary field of theories of truth
does not necessarily exhaust the options. More likely it does not.
1.2. PLURALISM ABOUT TRUTH
Alethic pluralism or pluralism about truth is one of the most recent contributions to
the debate. Pluralists such as Crispin Wright and Michael Lynch claim that there are
multiple substantive and substantively different, domain-specific truth properties. For
example, a version of pluralism could combine a coherentist notion of truth in one
domain with a correspondentist notion in another. All such theories conform (or can
be reduced) to a variant of the following schema:
(TP) ∀p [ T(p) ↔ ∃A [ A(p) ∧ Φ(A) ] ] ,
in which T is a general, domain-transcending, neutral truth predicate, A represents a
domain-specific truth property, and Φ is the method of identification of A as a truth
predicate (i.e. as representing a truth property).11 It should be noted, however, that
(TP) does not specify conceptual priority, nor mentions domains. The latter is easily
remedied:
(TP*) ∀p [ ∃D [ p∈D ∧ ( T(p) ↔ ∃A [ A(p) ∧ Φ(A,D) ] ) ] ] ,
in which D stands for the domain of p and Φ becomes a two-place predicate to denote
that it picks out a truth predicate A in a specific domain D. (TP*) adds more
complexity than necessary in the present context, however.
With regards to conceptual priority, several combinations of prior and posterior
concepts are (in principle) possible. Most varieties of alethic pluralism assume
conceptual priority of A and Φ. T is then a generalized truth predicate and Φ — as in
the above description — the criterion of identification of some A as representing a
truth property. The reverse is also possible: T and Φ could be prior, and A the
dependent or derivative. Φ then doesn’t identify, but generate A-truth properties, and
these A-truth properties are (more or less) elaborations or applications of (relatively)
basic T-truth. Bo Mou (2009) seems to argue for something like this.12 A third
11

See Lynch (2013), p. 26 for a version of this schema that, aside from partially specifying Φ, differs
only notationally.
12
There is reason to doubt that Mou’s “substantive perspectivism” is a variety of alethic pluralism.
According to Mou, A-truth properties are “substantive”, but his section 6.2.1 shows that they are not
theoretical-definable, which I take to be the defining criterion of substantiveness (see section 1.1).
Mou’s A-truth properties can play explanatory roles and are metaphysically and semantically relevant,
which means that they are primitive/basic (see table 1). Effectively, Mou reduces the differences
between kinds of truth properties to a single dimension (their explanatory role), thus conflating
primitive properties with substantive properties. However, alethic pluralism needs substantive A-truth
properties (in the sense of ‘substantive’ employed here) to substantiate its core notion of differing Atruth properties (see sections 2.3 and 3), and lacking such substantive A-truth properties, Mou’s theory
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possibility may be that T, A, and Φ all come together (i.e. none is prior or posterior),
in which case Φ specifies a conceptual relation between general T-truth and the
specific A-truths.
The various differences between versions of pluralism can be best understood in
terms of their answers to three questions about (TP): (i) Which predicates/properties
(T, A, Φ) are prior, and which are derived? (ii) What is the nature of Φ? And: (iii) Is
T-truth a substantive property?13 Because the dominant pluralisms (i.e. those
defended by Wright and Lynch) all give the same answer to (i) — that is, A and Φ are
prior, T is a generalization — I will further ignore that question here. (Lacking a
neutral term for Φ, I will, for the same reason, refer to Φ as ‘identification’ in the
following, but it should be taken into account that other conceptual priorities are (at
least in principle) possible.)
The simplest form of pluralism is disjunctivism, which can be formally
characterized as:
(Disj) ∀p [ T(p) ↔ ( (p∈D1 ∧ A1(p)) ∨ (p∈D2 ∧ A2(p)) ∨ … ∨ (p∈Dn ∧ An(p)) ) ] ,
in which D1…Dn represent domains and the Ai predicates represent domain-specific
truth properties. Hence, a statement in domain 1 is T-true if it is A1-true, and so forth.
For disjunctivism, Φ is, therefore, something like “being the truth property/predicate
listed as the one applying in the domain of p”. T-truth is not a substantive property.
The various Ai properties are substantive properties, but T-truth is nothing but the
disjunction of all those Ai properties. Wright’s (2001) version of pluralism gives a
similar answer to the third question, but a more sophisticated one to the second: Φ is a
collection of “platitudes” that serve to identify a truth property/predicate. This
collection of platitudes has more central and more peripheral members; one of the
most central platitudes is (Ts) or a variant thereof.
Lynch defended different versions of pluralism before and after 2006. (See Lynch
2013 for summaries of his earlier and later positions and for references.) Before, he
identified truth with the role property; that is, with “the property of having a property
that plays the truth-role” (2013, 29), which is the whole part right of the biconditional
in (TP), implying that the conditional in (TP) is a conceptual relation. Φ then, is
“playing the truth-role”. More recently, he speaks of Φ as “having the truish features
essentially” (p. 31). Those “truish features” are platitudes or truisms similar (but not
identical) to Wright’s. The subtle differences between Wright’s and Lynch’s Φ
matter, but the (here) most important difference is between their answers to the third
question: for Lynch (after 2006), T-truth is a substantive property; that is, it has a
theoretical definition and explanatory power aside from or in addition to the various
of truth is closer to the “quasi-pluralism” I am suggesting in section 3 than to the pluralism of Wright
and Lynch.
13
There are other differences, but beyond the rhetoric, all (here) essential differences boil down to the
answers to these questions.
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Ai properties. This gives Lynch an advantage over Wright and disjunctivism in
dealing with the problem of mixed discourse. To illustrate this problem, consider the
following two propositions:
(1) Whipping is painful and whipping is bad.
(2) Whipping is cruel.
(1) is a compound proposition and (2) is a simple proposition, but both are examples
of mixed discourse. In (1), the first conjunct belongs to a non-normative domain,
while the second belongs to a normative domain. ‘Cruel’ in (2) is an example of a
thick ethical concept that crosses domain boundaries: it is more or less in two
domains at once.
If the two conjuncts in (1) are abbreviated as a and b, respectively, then from the
nature of conjunction as a truth-functional connective it follows that T(a∧b) iff T(a)
and T(b), and if A1 and A2 are the domain-specific truth properties for the relevant
non-normative and normative domains, then from (TP) follows that T(a) iff A1(a) and
T(b) iff A2(b). If, however, only A properties are substantive, and T is not a “real”
property or a merely logical/syntactic property, then saying that (1) is true is not
really saying anything about (1) at all, but just about its parts. ⌜T(a∧b)⌝ then, is
nothing but convenient shorthand for ⌜A1(a)∧A2(b)⌝. If, on the other hand, T is a
substantive property (in addition to the substantive A properties), then ⌜T(a∧b)⌝
means and/or implies something more than just ⌜A1(a)∧A2(b)⌝ (leaving aside what
exactly that “something” is).14
This doesn’t solve the problem presented by (2), however. Unlike in the case of
mixed conjunctions like (1), there is only one proposition here: one proposition that
seems to be both normative and non-normative at the same time. One could, of
course, suggest that (2) can be reduced to (1), but that suggestion is controversial
among moral theorists. Another option could be that propositions that are in multiple
domains need to be A-true in all those domains to be T-true. I will not discuss this
suggestion here, but concentrate on McLeod’s reading of Wang Chong as a pluralist
instead.
2. WAS WANG CHONG A PLURALIST?
There are three pairs of contrasting concepts related to truth (and falsity) that occur in
Lun-Heng: shi/fei 是非, ran/fou 然否, and SHI/xu 實虛. To avoid excessive use of
Chinese characters, I will write SHI 實 in small capitals to distinguish it from
(lowercase) shi 是. McLeod’s (2011) reading of Wang Chong as a pluralist identifies
shi and ran as A predicates (in moral and non-moral domains, respectively), and SHI
14

The foregoing heavily depends on the conceptual priority assumed in most pluralisms (i.e. T as a
generalization). Indeed, he problem of mixed discourse only arises under that assumption. If on the
other hand, T is the prior concept and A-truths are applications or variants thereof, then the problem
does not arise.
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as either T or Φ or both (this is somewhat ambiguous). The domain boundary
between the moral and non-moral domains coincides with the shi/ran distinction:
“Non-moral statements cannot be 是 shi, just as moral principles cannot be 然 ran”
(54). McLeod writes that SHI “can be thought of as expressing a second-order
property — the property of having a property or properties that we should and do seek
when appraising statements” (55),15 and envisages this theory as a solution to the
problem of mixed conjunctions. In the latter context it becomes clear that SHI is T,
and that Φ is: to be “a property that we should and do seek when appraising
statements ”.16
McLeod further suggests that his pluralist reading of Wang Chong is closer to
Wright than to Lynch and because of its supposed solution to the problem of mixed
conjunctions can help in the contemporary debate about truth and pluralism. It seems
to me that his theory is rather similar to Lynch’s, however, and very different from
Wright’s (particularly, it shares the substantivity of T and the suggestion that this
solves the problem of mixed conjunctions with Lynch),17 but that is not an important
issue (although this observation does raise the question whether the theory does
actually add anything new to the debate). More important is that there is reason to
doubt that it can be a contribution to the contemporary debate. In reference to Φ as
the “property that we should and do seek when appraising statements”, McLeod
writes that this is “a brute fact about humans”, that “Wang Chong takes this
normativity as explanatorily basic” and that “this certainly would strike most of us in
the contemporary Western-based philosophical tradition as strange or implausible”
(56). However, if the latter is the case, then a theory of pluralism built on such a
“strange and implausible” foundation cannot possibly be a contribution to the
contemporary debate. (That would be like asking analytic metaphysicians to consider
a theory founded on an explanatorily basic notion of qi 氣.)
Furthermore, there are reasons to doubt McLeod’s attribution of pluralism as well.
The attribution would require (among others) that (1) SHI, shi, and ran are truth
predicates, (2) that they stand for substantive properties, and (3) that there is a clear
domain distinction between shi and ran and that shi and ran are substantively
different. All of these claims are problematic, however, as I will show below.

15

Strictly speaking this way of phrasing is incorrect. A second-order property is a property of a
property (or a kind of properties, but that is only notationally different). The property of having a
property is not a second-order property, but it may involve one if this implies an appeal to a kind of
properties. In (TP), ∃F[F(p)∧Φ(F)] formalizes the property of having a property; therein, Φ is a
second-order property, but ∃F[F(p)∧Φ(F)] as a whole is a complex first-order property of p.
16
The phrase “the property of having a property or properties that we should and do seek when
appraising statements” describes the right hand side of (TP) as a whole. Φ is just part thereof.
17
McLeod writes that a mixed conjunction is SHI “just in case it has the properties we do and should
seek when appraising sentences” (56). That is the substantive nature of T-truth (i.e. SHI).
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2.1. THE (A)SYMMETRY OF SHI/XU
Of the three pairs of truth-like concepts, shi/fei 是非, ran/fou 然否, and SHI/xu 實虛,
the first two are obviously symmetrical, but this is not the case for the third. That is,
shi and fei are contradictories and therefore symmetrical, and so are ran and fou, but
the logical relation between SHI and xu is less clear. The problem is that — given the
meaning of xu as something like ‘mere attractive appearance’ (see section 3.2 of
McLeod’s paper) — there are two possibilities, symmetry and asymmetry, but both
lead to the conclusion that SHI is not general T-truth in (TP) or even not a truth
predicate at all (i.e. does not represent a truth property).
McLeod argues explicitly for symmetry in his section 3.2. This means that if xu is
mere attractive appearance, then SHI, “as the opposite of xu” (50), is non-mereappearance — i.e. objectively true/real — but also non-attractive (at least to “ordinary
people”). He bases this view on a single passage in Dui-Zuo 對作 §218 in which Wang
Chong claims that “SHI is not quickly/easily understood” (實事不能快意). The passage
does not imply (or even suggest) that such difficulty or unattractiveness is a defining
characteristic of SHI, however — it may be mere accidental property. Furthermore, if
McLeod is right that SHI and xu are contradictories like the other two pairs, then this
would lead to another asymmetry, namely between SHI/xu and the other two pairs,
which do not (directly) concern attractiveness, and that would seem to disqualify SHI
as a T generalization of shi and ran. What is more, ‘unattractively true’ does not
represent a truth property at all (but a compound property also involving truth) and
certainly not one that would be picked out by McLeod’s Φ.
Symmetry then, is not an option, but neither is asymmetry. If SHI is a genuine
truth predicate, and SHI and xu are thus not contradictories, then xu implies not-SHI,
but not the other way around: there are (then) multiple ways of being not-SHI (false).
Although I think that this is a much more plausible interpretation of SHI/xu, it does,
however, create a new problem illustrated by figure 1.
Figure 1: logical relations between five of the six concepts
SHI 實

shi 是

ran 然

fei 非

fou 否
?

18

The paragraph number refers to the Chinese Text Project edition at http://ctext.org/Lun-Heng
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The figure shows the logical relations between five of the six concepts, omitting xu,
and assuming McLeod’s pluralist interpretation. The arrows stand for conditionals:
anything that is shi is also SHI, or formally: ∀p[shi(p)→SHI(p)], and so forth. The
crossed-out dotted lines stand for contradiction: ∀p¬[shi(p)↔fei(p)], and so forth.
What is conspicuously missing in the figure is the contradictory of SHI. If shi and ran
are two different ways of being SHI, and SHI is, therefore, general T-truth in (TP), then
fei and fou as, respectively, not-shi and not-ran must be two different ways of being
not-SHI. Xu is not not-SHI (xu implies not-SHI, but not conversely), but neither is there
another (obvious) candidate for not-SHI in Lun-Heng (aside, perhaps, from 不實,
although this does not seem to occur as an explicitly general/neutral form of fei and
fou). But this means that from fei(p) we can infer ¬shi(p), but from ¬shi(p) we cannot
infer ¬SHI(p) (that would be the fallacy of denying the antecedent). In other words, if
there is no contradictory of SHI, then one cannot derive not-SHI from fei or fou either,
but that is absurd and cannot charitably be attributed to Wang Chong. Of course, this
conclusion does not follow if we add two additional assumptions:
(3) ∀p [ SHI (p) → ( shi (p) ∨ ran (p) ) ]
(4) ∀p [ ( fei (p)→¬ran (p) ) ∧ ( fou (p)→¬shi (p) ) ]
(i.e. that there are two and only two ways of being SHI, namely shi and ran; and that
fei, respectively fou, implies not-ran, respectively not-shi).19 It may very well be the
case that Wang Chong held both, at least implicitly, but especially (3) would require
textual support as this assumption is not obvious. Furthermore, it is rather implausible
that Wang Chong would assume all these logical relations (those in (3) and (4) and
those mentioned above) and not assume or introduce a contradictory of SHI (which
would allow much easier and more intuitive inference of not-SHI from fei). The fact
that he did not, suggests that he didn’t feel the need to do so, which in turn suggests
that SHI plays a different role than that of general T-truth.
To phrase the problem in somewhat different (and much weaker) terms: In a
genuine pluralism, one would expect a general(ized), domain-transcending concept to
behave in ways similar to its domain-specific counterparts. If domain-specific
concepts come in contradictory pairs, then one would expect the general(ized)
concept to do the same. If the apparent general(ized) concept behaves differently (in
this respect) than the domain-specific concepts, then most likely it is not a general
form thereof (but it may be related in another way, of course), and one is probably not
dealing with a genuine pluralism. But if this is right, then SHI is not a truth predicate,
or at least not general T-truth in (TP).
19

There are other sets of additional assumptions possible that would lead to the same results, but those
would be considerably less intuitive, and therefore less plausible, than these. Notice also that (4)
depends on (3), and that if (3) would distinguish more truth properties, (4) would need to be adapted to
that. With these assumptions, from fei(p) and (4) follows ¬ran(p), and from ¬ran(p) and ¬shi(p) and
(3) follows ¬SHI(p) by modus tollens.
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2.2. THE IDENTIFICATION OF TRUTH PREDICATES
The problem addressed in the previous sub-section raises a more general question: To
what extent is McLeod’s case for pluralism dependent on and/or motivated by
translation or interpretation of the apparently truth-like concepts (shi, ran, SHI) as
truth predicates?
To assess the implications of this question, consider the following imaginary case:
On some small island there are red and green fruits and feathered and featherless nonsea animals. The language of the Islanders, Islandish, makes these distinctions and
further includes (among others) the predicates ‘edible’ and ‘poisonous’. Red fruits
and feathered (non-sea) animals are considered edible by the Islanders. Thus far, the
case is exactly parallel to the above: red is shi, green is fei, feathered is ran,
featherless is fou, edible is SHI and poisonous is xu. Obviously, no one would want to
say that the Islanders have a pluralistic notion of edibility, so there must be some
significant difference between this case and the case of shi/ran/SHI. Assume further
that the tribe on the neighboring island speaks a different language — let’s call it
Neighborese — and that Neighborese uses one and the same predicate term for edible
stuff, red fruits, and feathered animals. Now, what reason do we have to believe that
English does not relate to Wang Chong’s (use of) Chinese, in the same way that
Neighborese relates to Islandish? The problem is that without an answer to this
question, the thesis that Wang Chong’s notion of truth is pluralistic while the
Islanders’ notion of edibility is not, is incongruent and therefore indefensible. There
are significant differences between the two cases, however, and some of these
undermine the analogy, but those that do so, reveal problems that undermine
McLeod’s attribution of pluralism even more.
The most obvious difference is that ‘edible’, ‘red’, and ‘feathered’ have very
different meanings, while shi, ran, and SHI have very similar meanings. However,
these conceptual (dis)similarities are (dis)similarities to us; a speaker of Neighborese
may perceive very different conceptual (dis)similarities. Moreover, relying on this
difference between the two cases would be begging the question as the (relevant)
conceptual similarity between shi, ran, and SHI is part of what needs to be established
to attribute pluralism.20
A second difference is that the above suggests that Neighborese can only translate
all three terms with one and the same term, but there is no similar necessity in English
20

Perhaps, it would not be seriously question-begging to rely on some kind of minimal similarity,
such as a similarity in functional role, but it is entirely possible that ‘edible’, ‘red’, and ‘feathered’
function very similarly in Islandish — we cannot tell without knowing more about the language. More
important, however, is that “similarity in functional role” means that the three predicates conform to
one and the same rule, and and as Kripke/Wittgenstein pointed out, anything can be made to accord
with some rule (or, there is always a rule that actual use accords to). In other words, shi, ran, and SHI
may be functionally similar, for example, in the sense that they are all disquotational in the sense
implied in (Ts) — assuming that they are — but there is some rule under which ‘edible’, ‘red’, and
‘feathered’ are functionally similar as well.
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to translate shi, ran, and SHI the same. Shi could be translated with ‘right’, for
example, and ran with ‘is the case’ (as suggested by McLeod on p. 46). Considering
that SHI 實 is used in many different senses including ‘reality’ and ‘actuality’ (see
section 2 of McLeod 2011), and given Wang Chong’s use of the term in Lun-Heng,
‘objectivity/objective’ seems a plausible alternative to ‘truth/true’. Moreover,
‘objective’ seems a more natural contrasting term to xu as ‘mere attractive
appearance’ than ‘true’. While this difference may undermine the Islanders analogy,
it undermines the attribution of pluralism to an even greater extent. The notions of
objectivity and truth are closely related, but sufficiently different to not be considered
the same (kind of) notion or to stand in the relation of general form T and domainspecific A in (TP), and therefore, do not suggest pluralism. And if the choice for a
different, and not prima facie implausible translation removes the suggestion of
pluralism, then there is not much of a case for pluralism to begin with.
There is a third difference between the two cases that becomes obvious when
considering McLeod’s main argument for the pluralist interpretation:
the ability to discriminate between 實 shi and 虛 xu allows us to both distinguish between
然 ran and 否 fou and to distinguish between 是 shi and 非 fei. In order for this to be the
case, there must be some univocal concept of 實 shi that captures the similarities between
the various properties which count as shi-properties. (55)

The obvious disanalogy between McLeod’s argument (and the passages from LunHeng it is based on) and the case of the Islanders and ‘edibility’ is the difference in
discriminatory dependence. It seems plausible indeed that Wang Chong (at least in
Duizuo) held that the ability to discriminate SHI from xu allows discrimination of the
other two contrasts — in that direction — while the dependency in the Islanders case is
obviously the other way around (the discrimination of edibility is the dependent rather
than the independent). Although this may very well be a refuting disanalogy, there is
a serious problem with McLeod’s argument. Discriminatory dependence does indeed
imply some commonality, but it does not imply that that commonality must take the
kind of form implied in pluralism — there are many other possibilities. For example,
the ability to discriminate the letters a and u allows me to discriminate the word ‘fan’
from ‘fun’ and ‘staff’ from ‘stuff’; the ability to discriminate between light and dark
allows me to discriminate between day and night, and between white and black; and
the ability to discriminate between earthquakes and storms allows me to discriminate
between a tsunami and a storm surge. In none of these cases it follows that the
concepts are relevantly similar and/or related in a relevant way (rather, in the first
case the relation is one of parts and wholes, in the second there is (a.o.) a
phenomenological similarity, and in the third there is a causal relation). A relation
between discriminatory abilities implies a relation between some characteristics, but
not necessarily between relevant characteristics, and not necessarily a relevant kind of
relation.
Furthermore, as an argument for pluralism the discriminatory dependence
argument relies heavily on a presumed (and thus question-begging) similarity
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between the concepts involved, which is illustrated by inserting the alternative
translations suggested above into the quote by McLeod:
The ability to discriminate between what is objective and what is mere attractive
appearance allows us to both distinguish between what is the case and what isn’t and to
distinguish between right and wrong.

Phrased like this, there doesn’t seem to be much of an argument for pluralism.
2.3. ARE SHI AND RAN SUBSTANTIVE PROPERTIES?
As mentioned above, contemporary pluralism about truth is inflationary. That is, it
assumes that there are multiple substantive, and substantively different truth
properties. The reason for this assumption is that it would be difficult otherwise to
meaningfully connect and distinguish the various truth properties. For example, if a
pluralism distinguishes true-1 and true-2 and these are not substantive properties,
then statements that are true-1 have nothing in common with each other except that
they are true-1, and nothing in common with statements that are true-2 at all. Hence,
there would be no connection whatsoever between true-1 and true-2; no reason to
assume that they are similar notions (i.e. that they are both truth properties), and thus
no pluralism. If another pluralism would distinguish true-3 and true-4, but both would
stand for truth as correspondence, then there would be no substantive difference
between them, and therefore, no reason to distinguish them and no pluralism. The
latter case would be a kind of quasi-pluralism at best; that is, a difference in predicate
terms and domains only, comparable to the distinction between iru and aru in
Japanese for ‘being’ of animates and inanimates, respectively. (A deflationist or
primitivist might try to escape the conclusion that true-1 and true-2 have nothing in
common by bringing in functionalism. ‘True-1’ and ‘true-2’ are then identified as
truth predicates by the functional roles they play. This would, however, preclude any
substantive difference between the truth properties, leading to the quasi-pluralism of
the second scenario.) Consequently, a pluralist interpretation of Wang Chong requires
that shi and ran represent substantive, and substantively different properties (i.e. that
the difference between them amounts to more than just a difference of domains as in
iru/aru). The problem is that there doesn’t seem to be sufficient evidence for either of
these requirements.
There is nothing in Lun-Heng that suggests that Wang Chong considered truth to
be a substantive property. It was already mentioned in section 1.1 that the
correspondence theory cannot be plausibly attributed to Wang Chong, but there are
other options for a substantive truth property, such as verificationism and
coherentism. There are a few occasions where he suggests a relation between
evidence and truth, which might suggest something like verificationism, but a close
reading teaches that the relation is indirect: evidence establishes truth.21 In more
21

See for example, Yu-Zeng 語增 §11, Zhi-Shi 知實 §1, and Shi-Ying 是應 §22.
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modern terms, what Wang Chong argues (or assumes) in those passages is that
justification depends on evidence, not that truth (itself) depends on evidence or that
evidence makes statements true.
The closest Wang Chong comes to coherentism is his argument in Lei-Xu 雷虛
§20 (see the second quote below) that two contradictory statements cannot both be
right. A coherentist notion of truth, however, asserts that coherence makes statements
true, which is a much stronger claim than Wang Chong’s. The passage only claims
that incoherence implies non-truth, and from that it cannot be inferred that coherence
implies truth (or even makes true). A more plausible interpretation is that coherence is
a necessary but not sufficient condition for justification. (Combining this with the
above: justification requires both evidence and coherence.)
Absence of evidence (for substantive truth properties) does not imply evidence of
absence, of course, but given the importance of truth to Wang Chong — telling the
truth and dispelling falsehoods is the whole point of his book — it would be odd (to
say the least) if he adhered to a substantive notion of truth without ever suggesting
what true statements have in common. The fact that he — in a book in which truth
plays such a central role — never even hinted at what truth is or what shi, ran, or SHI
mean strongly suggests that he (implicitly!) considered truth to be primitive. (This
still leaves many options open: shi and ran could be primitives and SHI defined as shi
or ran; or SHI could be primitive and shi and ran defined as domain-specific versions
thereof; or all three could be primitive; and so forth.)
Furthermore, there isn’t much evidence for substantial difference between shi and
ran either, and even the domain distinction seems to be rather fluid. One might expect
ran to be more explicitly connected with evidence and facts than shi, for example, but
this turns out not to be the case, as illustrated by the following fragment, which also
raises the question of translation again:
考察前後，效驗自列，自列，則是非之實有所定矣。If we examine what comes first
and [what comes] later, then the evidence arranges itself, and if [the evidence] arranges
itself, the SHI of shi/fei is determined! (Yu-Zeng 語增 §11)

I have left 是非之實 more or less untranslated here. If SHI is translated as
‘objectivity/objective’ as suggested above and shi and fei as ‘right’ and ‘wrong’
respectively, then 是非之實 would be “the objectivity of right and wrong”. The phrase
是非之實 also occurs in Lei-Xu §20 in the context of a discussion of two contradictory
views on the nature of thunder:
二家相違也，并而是之，無是非之分。無是非之分，故無是非之實。
The two
houses are in mutual opposition, but if both would be shi, then there would be no
distinction between shi and fei. And if there would be no distinction between shi and fei,
then there would be no SHI of shi/fei.

In both these fragments shi/fei is applied to non-moral, rather than moral domains
(history in the first, thunder in the second). That is, shi/fei occurs where the pluralist
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interpretation predicts ran/fou. It seems to be the case that shi/fei can be substituted
for ran/fou (but not the other way around, and perhaps only in certain circumstances),
except in cases where it is necessary to make an explicit shi/ran distinction. That
would be impossible, however, in case of the strict domain-dependency implied in
pluralism. In other words, if shi is not domain-specific, then it cannot be a truth
predicate in the A role in (TP).
On the other hand, the domain boundary does not need to coincide with the
terminological boundary (between shi and ran). This isn’t the case in English either,
where only the use of adjectives would distinguish different truth properties. It is
plausible that there are two truth properties in Lun-Heng indeed, one of which can be
expressed by both shi and ran, and one of which can be expressed by shi only. This
would make sense if the former is something like non-moral or non-normative truth
and the second moral or normative truth, and if ran is understood as a loose
correspondence notion (see section 1.1). (McLeod’s case for the domain distinction in
Lun-Heng is strong, and is supported by much more textual evidence than he quotes.)
Rather than translating shi and ran as ‘right’ and ‘true’, better translations would then
be ‘truth/true/right’ (depending on context) for shi, and ‘is the case’ (or something
similar) for ran. (This would change the translation of 是非之實 into “the objectivity
of truth and falsehood”, which appears to be exactly what Wang Chong meant with
the phrase in the above two quotes.) It should be noted, however, that this is not the
shi/ran pluralism McLeod is suggesting.
3. QUASI-PLURALISM
The previous sections present a number of arguments against McLeod’s interpretation
of Wang Chong as a pluralist: (1) the problematic (a)symmetry of SHI/xu, suggesting
that SHI is not a general(ized) truth predicate T; (2) the dependency on a particular
translation or interpretation of the apparent truth-like concepts involved; (3) the lack
of evidence for substantivity of shi and ran; and (4) the lack of a sharp and clear
domain boundary between shi and ran. Although this seems more than sufficient to
discard McLeod’s attribution of pluralism to Wang Chong, I find the idea too
valuable (and the underlying domain distinction too pervasive) for such blanket
rejection. For that reason, in this last section I want to explore the question whether
the critical remarks in the previous sections leave any room for some kind of
pluralism.
There is little evidence that Wang Chong thought of the normative domain as
comprising more than ethics, but I will adopt a more general notion of the normative
domain here (distinguishing sub-domains when necessary). In Wang Chong’s terms
(or what I take them to be), non-normative truth can be expressed with shi and ran,
but truth in the normative domain only with shi. I do not consider Wang Chong’s
third truth-like notion, SHI, to be a truth predicate for reasons explained in section 2.1,
but to mean something like ‘objective/objectivity’, and because of this, it plays no
role in the following. (That is not to say that the concept is not important, or that it is
unrelated to truth, just that it isn’t ‘truth’.) Rather, shi can also function as general T-
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truth in (TP), in the same way that ‘true’ can be used in any domain and as
general(ized) truth predicate in English, marking distinctions when necessary by
means of adjectives. (The following is not dependent on Wang Chong’s terminology,
however, but merely takes inspiration from it.) What identifies truth
properties/predicates (i.e. Φ) is Tarski’s disquotational schema (Ts), and nothing but
(Ts). (Note that while this Φ picks out shi and ran as truth predicates, it is far less
clear whether SHI is similarly disquotational.)
What appears to be the most serious problem for a pluralist interpretation of
Wang Chong is that identified in section 2.3: the truth predicates involved do not
seem to stand for substantive properties. A defensive response to this objection would
be to deny the conclusion. As mentioned, absence of evidence does not imply
evidence of evidence: perhaps, Wang Chong really held truth properties to be
substantive and just did not realize the importance of substantiating (or even
mentioning) their substantivity. This, for reasons mentioned, seems a rather weak
response, however. The alternative is biting the bullet: assuming that the truth
properties expressed by shi and ran are primitive indeed and seeing where this leads
(if it leads anywhere). (To soften that bullet, see Asay 2013 for a rigorous defense of
primitivism.)
The essential difference between the primitivist and the inflationist is that the
former takes truth to be (explanatorily) basic: there are no more basic concepts that
explain or define truth, and nothing “makes statements true” (except, perhaps, in the
very loose sense that true statements are true because of how the world is). But at the
same time, truth being basic means that other concepts and ideas can be built upon it:
truth can (help) explain other concepts (such as meaning in Davidsonian primitivism),
and truth can have implications. And if that is the case, then it would seem that
different domain-specific truth properties can have different domain-specific
implications. That, however, is not the case, or not exactly at least. If truth is basic
and therefore undefinable and unexplainable in more basic terms, then we cannot
make good sense of the idea of different notions of truth. We can only distinguish
notions of truth if we can compare their definitions or compare what follows from
them and cannot be attributed to other differences. The latter, however, is never the
case: any apparent difference between implications of different truth properties can be
explained by and attributed to a difference between domains.
It seems then, that primitivism and pluralism cannot be usefully combined, that
any attempt to do so leads to the quasi-pluralism of the iru/aru distinction: plants and
buildings aru (are), animals and people iru (are), but there is no substantive
difference between those two verbs, nothing hangs on the difference. The difference
between the domains is real enough, however; nothing may hang on the difference
between iru and aru (except when used as auxiliary verbs), but the difference
between animates and inanimates matters, at least in some contexts. Similarly, the
difference between normative and non-normative domains matters, at least in some
contexts. Perhaps, it is not truth itself that differs between domains, but that does not
preclude other truth-related differences. If that is the case, the different truth terms
merely mark those related differences. This raises the question, of course, what those
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truth-related differences between domains could be. To that question, I have two
answers, one metaphysical and one epistemological, but both deserve a much more
extensive treatment than is possible here, and there may be further answers.
The metaphysical difference concerns the primitivist reading of (Tf). If the
biconditional in (Tf) is understood to imply ontological dependence, then a primitivist
can only read (Tf) as “true statements are factmakers” (in contrast to the
correspondentist reading of “facts are truthmakers”). Davidson, the most outspoken
primitivist, never made this claim, but Samuel Wheeler (2014) argues convincingly
that it does follow from Davidson’s account of truth and interpretation. The
metaphysics of “factmaking”, however, differs somewhat between normative and
non-normative domains: in the former the true statement creates the fact, while in the
latter it merely assigns the status of ‘fact’ to a thereby delimited and described chunk
or part of (objective/independent) reality. Non-normative factmaking creates facts as
facts, but only as facts.
The epistemological difference is a difference in justification, a notion so close to
truth, that the two are rarely kept apart sufficiently, and nowhere is this as clear as in
the idea of truth as a goal of inquiry. “We do not aim at truth but at honest
justification,” wrote Davidson (1999, 461). His point was that when we say that we
want our statements or beliefs to be true, what we want is overwhelming evidence or
an irrefutable argument; hence, justification. And moreover, we cannot ask for more
than that; “it makes no sense to ask for more” (id; see also 2005a, chapter 1).22
Davidson defended a coherence theory of justification (2001, ch. 10): a belief is
justified (or one is justified to believe that a belief is true) if it coheres with most of
one’s other beliefs, especially with one’s “most basic” beliefs, where those “most
basic” beliefs provide the most direct link to reality, thus guaranteeing that
“coherence yields correspondence” (2001, 137). Although he assumed that this is
sufficient for justification in all domains (or more accurately, he did not distinguish
domains), I think there are good reasons to believe that there are differences between
normative and non-normative domains. What distinguishes justification in normative
from non-normative domains is firstly the lack of (obvious) “most basic” (purely)
normative beliefs (at least in the same sense of ‘most basic’), secondly the asymmetry
between the two domains in the sense that justification in the normative domain also
requires coherence with the non-normative domain but not vice versa,23 and thirdly
22

The rejection of truth as a goal of inquiry seems to conflict with the importance truth plays in
Davidson’s philosophy as a whole. It very much seems the case that (for Davidson, as well as for many
others) the pursuit of truth is the purpose of science and philosophy. However, if Davidson (and others
who made a similar point) are right that truth cannot be a norm, then ‘truth’ in ‘aiming for truth’ can
only be a (misleading) metaphor for justification (which illustrates and strengthens the point made
above: truth and justification are not kept apart sufficiently). (Mou (2009) suggests another way to
resolve the tension by distinguishing truth pursuit as a tactical goal and as a strategic goal. The former
is what Davidson rejects; the latter is what he (implicitly) affirms. It is not entirely clear, however, (to
me, at least) whether truth pursuit as a strategic goal can be made sufficiently precise without reducing
it to tactical goals.)
23
Except, of course, that coherence itself is a normative notion (belonging to the logical sub-domain).
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that normative domains have regulatory purposes (that is what ‘normative’ means).
Arguably, the purpose of the normative sub-domain of logic is to regulate reasoning,
and the purpose of the sub-domain of ethics is to regulate society (or to regulate
behavior to make society possible). These regulatory purposes need to be taken into
account: justification in those domains also requires coherence with those purposes.
These metaphysical and epistemological differences between the normative and
non-normative domains illustrate that even if truth isn’t a substantive property, there
are differences between those domains that are closely related to truth. Hence, quasipluralism may not be a pluralism about truth, strictly speaking, but it is certainly a
pluralism relevant to truth.24 Of course, it is implausible that Wang Chong held
exactly this pluralism — it relies too much on Davidson for that suggestion to make
sense. Nevertheless, it seems to me that Wang Chong implicitly held something very
much like this. The essential difference is in the explicitness of the above versus the
implicitness of Wang Chong’s account of truth. It is the explicitness that allows a
more detailed elaboration, and it is mainly in that elaboration (i.e. the specific domain
differences suggested above) that the two quasi-pluralisms differ. Wang Chong’s
“theory” of truth probably remained implicit because there was no need to make it
explicit (lacking a debate about the nature of truth), and theoretically underdeveloped
because it remained implicit. It should be noted that the suggestion in this section
remains underdeveloped as well, both as a theory about truth and as an interpretation
of Wang Chong’s (implicit) “theory” of truth. And although this interpretation differs
significantly from McLeod’s, it is based on his suggestion and agrees with him in at
least one important respect: “the pluralist conception of truth arising from Wang’s
work differs significantly from contemporary pluralist theories of truth” (40). That is
more than enough reason for further research, and to award Wang Chong a less
peripheral position in philosophical attention space.
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